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Abstract
The ability of the Merton model and the logistic regression to accurately forecast cor-
porate defaults is evaluated. Additionally, the probability-of-default (PD) estimates
obtained from these two models are compared with the corresponding rating class his-
toric default rates presented by Moody’s. Data for 56 defaulted and 272 healthy US
publicly traded organizations serves as the basis for this study. Results reveal that: (i)
the logistic regression is more accurate in distinguishing between defaulted and healthy
companies, but provides overly conservative PD estimates; (ii) the Merton model strug-
gles to correctly identify true defaults and true non-defaults, while providing default
probabilities that are in line with historic default rates (iii) no framework was deemed
superior in this context, ascertaining the difficulty associated with identifying the precise
timing of a corporate default.
KEY WORDS: Moody’s, Merton Model, Logistic Regression, Probability of Default,
Credit Ratings.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) are among the most important members of the finan-
cial system, having the ability to influence the behavior of almost all capital market
participants. Regulators use them to monitor the solvency of banks and other financial
institutions, investors rely on them to observe the riskiness of their investments and to
alter their portfolios accordingly, banks and other investment vehicles utilize rating mi-
gration metrics to determine the default correlation within their portfolios of assets (Du
and Suo, 2007). This grants rating agencies the status of universally feared gatekeepers,
particularly when the process of issuing public debt securities is taken into consideration.
Since market participants do not possess nether the resources nor the time to adequately
assess the risk related to investing in a specific debt instrument, they most often resort
to the expertise of rating agencies, when evaluating domestic and cross-border financial
transactions. CRAs therefore have a profound impact on the borrowing costs of organi-
zations and can noticeably affect the decision process regarding their capital structure.
(Schwarcz, 2002).
With that in mind, the methodology applied by CRAs is rather secretive and only
one of the most renowned rating agencies, Moody’s, is more explicit about its KMW
model. It emphasizes the usage of three main elements in the process of determining the
default probability of a company, namely the value of its assets, the riskiness of these
assets, and the amount of leverage the firm has on its books. These elements are then
utilized in the process of estimating the volatility of mentioned assets. All the afore-
mentioned elements are subsequently combined together, in an effort to as accurately as
possible approximate the firm specific distance-to-default (DD), which is then translated
into probability-of-default (PD). The actual mechanism governing this conversion pro-
cess is based on the historically observed relationship between DD and PD. The rating
1
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agency also specifies that the probability for an average publicly traded firm to default
during a one year time frame is 2%. This number naturally varies quite significantly
with rating classes, where an Aaa-rated organization is anticipated to have default odds
of about 2 in 10,000 per annum and an A1-rated company is expected to experience
bankruptcy with odds of 10 in 10,000. However, Moody’s claims that prior to default,
there is no unequivocal method to ascertain whether such an event will occur or not
(Crosbie and Bohn, 2003). In line with this, there are two major instances that have
put a significant dent in the reputation of CRAs, resulting in palpable doubts regarding
their ability to assess the creditworthiness of companies and various financial instru-
ments alike. The failure of Enron, a US based financial behemoth, in 2002 raised serious
concerns about the quality of credit assessment provided by CRAs. The company had an
investment grade rating, meaning that it represented a low level of default risk, awarded
to it from all three major CRAs, namely Moody’s, S&P and Fitch. Even though CRAs
reacted to the deterioration of the company’s financial strength, their reassessment of
the ability of Enron to repay its creditors was arguably much slower than desirable,
causing significant losses to a large pool of investors (Lieberman et. al, 2002). The
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008-2009 unfortunately ascertained that this was not
an isolated incident. By December 2008, the market for structured financial products in
the US has ballooned. By December 2008, the market for structured financial products
in the US had ballooned to $11 trillion or 35% of the total outstanding bond market in
the world ’s largest economy. More than half of these securities, which academics and
regulators will eventually name as one of the most, if not the most important underlying
causes for the GFC, were granted an Aaa rating by Moody’s. Even though the rating
agency eventually downgraded 36,346 of these instruments, many still blame the CRAs
for their lack of timely reassessment during a period, which nearly resulted in the demise
of the modern financial system (Benmelech and Dlugosz, 2010).
The reasons behind such failures of CRAs are complex and to a certain extend
related to the building blocks of the entire financial system. Although it is quite clear
that CRAs are not the sole culprits for the aforementioned financial disasters, there are
at least three aspects related to their structure and the nature of their work, requiring
the upmost attention from all market agents, which are heavily reliant on their rating
assessments. Firstly, Moody’s, Fitch and S&P accounted for 96.5% of all the credit
ratings issued in 2013 in the US, according to data from the official report of the US
Securities and Exchange Commission. This represents a relatively insignificant change
from the 98.7% market share that these institutions had in 2007. This is even more
troubling, when one accounts for the implication that CRAs are publicly traded enti-
ties, which are naturally concerned with profit maximization. Since their profitability is
strongly related to the ability to charge fees from debt issuers, a sinister from of moral
hazard arises. Due to the costly nature of risk assessments and the fact that issuers are
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free to choose which rating agency to commission, the latter have an incentive to assign
higher ratings to the former in their strive to win market share and boost operating
performance. (Ma¨hlmann, 2008). This needs to be coupled with the fact that rating
agencies do not provide an absolute measure of credit risk, but rather a relative ranking
for default risk from high to low. The lack of actual PD estimates is further amplified
by the information that intervals and ratios between different ranks are meaningless,
implying that no realistic answer can be found to questions such as whether or not a one
notch downgrade from Baa3 to B1 result in the same type of risk increase as a similar
downgrade from Aa3 to A1 (Ma¨hlmann, 2008).
Considering the aforementioned characteristics of CRAs and the secretive nature of
the risk assessment methodology applied by them, the realization that academics have
been attempting to find alternative ways to measure the riskiness of debt obligations
can hardly be deemed surprising (Ma¨hlmann, 2008). One obvious answer can be found
in the work of Robert Merton and his famous model from 1974. It is a structural model,
resting to a high degree on the notion that the risk level associated with a particular
debt obligation can be determined via the careful and thorough analysis of the issuer’s
balance sheet. The fixed liabilities of the company are seen as a boundary, which the
total assets of the organization must not cross. If such an instance does however occur,
the firm is naturally unable to service the contractual obligations and thus effectively
enters default. The Merton model therefore is based on the very straightforward and
rudimentary accounting principle that the equity of a company is equal to the value of
its assets less its liabilities. The equity is then simply seen as a call option on the firm’s
assets, which at maturity pays either zero, if the value of the liabilities is larger than the
value of the assets, or the difference between the asset and liability values (Gordy and
Heitfield, 2002). By combining the Black and Scholes (1973) option pricing formula,
with one of the most important accounting principles, the Merton model provides a
viable alternative for determining the riskiness of corporate debt.
An additional large body of academic research is related to the usage of financial
ratios in order to predict the failure of corporations. Unlike the Merton model, this ap-
proach is statistical in its nature and has the advantage of utilizing financial indicators,
such as Cash Flow to Total Debt and Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) to
Book Value of Total Debt, which are easily available in the accounting documentation
of organizations. Via the application of these and numerous other financial rations,
researchers have attempted to measure the ability of organizations to fulfill their debt
obligations. The utilizations of the Logit regression framework, which uses such ratios
as dependent variables, has further improved the methodology, therefore solidifying its
position as an additional alternative to the above listed risk assessment methodologies
(Frade, 2008).
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Considering that there are a number of viable ways, which can be implemented dur-
ing the process of assessing the ability of an issuer to service its debt obligations, and
the arguably lackluster performance of CRAs during the GFC, a comparison between
the former and latter methods can be of interest. The aim of this paper is therefore
twofold. First, to evaluate the ability of the Merton model and a Logit regression per-
formed on financial ratios to accurately predict corporate defaults. Second, the resulting
default probabilities obtained from the aforementioned methodologies will be compared
with the historically observed default rates associated with the various rating classes of
Moody’s. Moody’s was selected for this research because it is the rating agency that is
least secretive about its methodology. Additionally, since it does not provide the public
with an explicit PD for each company, historic default rates, matched with the credit
rating assigned by Moody’s to a business, can be deemed a reasonable metric for credit
risk (Bharat and Shumway, 2004).
In order to achieve the above specified goals, data for 272 healthy and 56 defaulted,
publicly traded US companies in the period between 2006 and 2012 was obtained. This
time frame captures one of the most severe recessions in recent history, and is thus
related to a large number of corporate defaults and high level of credit risk, making
accurate PD calculations critical. Additionally, as the US market is the world’s largest
and is characterized with possibly the most sophisticate investor base, it can be deemed
as a suitable choice in this context. Since the S&P 500 is the broadest and one of the
best recognized US composites, only companies that have been listed on it for the entire
period of interest will be considered for this research.
In light of the aforementioned objective of this paper and with respect to the par-
ticular data set being utilized, this study will argue that the Merton model is much
closer in its assessment for default probabilities to the historically observed bankruptcy
rates presented by Moody’s. The logistic regression is considerably more conservative
in its predictions and in some instances produces PD estimates that are unrealistically
high. With that in mind, both the Merton model and the credit ratings of Moody’s in
some cases lack the ability to quickly adjust their PD forecasts for organizations that are
nearing default. This implication leads to the conclusion that none of the approaches
being considered in this work offers a satisfactory balance between conservativeness and
capacity to correctly identify healthy companies that are not expected to go bankrupt.
The rest of this paper will be structured in the following fashion: the next section
gives the theoretical framework, which serves as the foundation for the subsequent em-
pirical study. It includes additional clarification regarding the methodology utilized by
Moody’s; a detailed explanation of all the relevant features of the Merton model; de-
scription of the logic behind Logitic regression and the financial ratios that were deemed
suitable in this context; and clarification of the methodology used in the process of as-
sessing the ability of the Merton model and the Logit regression to correctly identify
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healthy and defaulted companies. Section three describes details regarding the data
set being used. Section four portrays the results of the empirical work and offers the
relevant analysis. Finally, the last section contains the concluding remarks.
Chapter 2
Theoretical Framework
2.1 Moody’s credit ratings and rating methodology
The most important role of CRAs is to present participants on the financial markets
with reliable assessments of the creditworthiness of debt issuers (Hull, 2012). In this
research only credit ratings from Moody’s will be employed. This mirrors the approach
taken in previous empirical work (see Bharat and Shumway, 2004, Tudela and Young,
2003) and is due to the less secretive nature of Moody’s methodology.
The rating classes as specified by Moody’s from highest to lowest are: Aaa, Aa, A,
Baa, Ba, B, Caa, Ca and C (for additional information of Moody’s credit ratings and
historical default probabilities see Table A.2 in Appendix). As previously mentioned,
the higher the credit rating, the lower is the historically observed default rate for com-
panies that belong to this rating class. Furthermore, there are subcategories for each
rating class, namely Aa1, Aa2, Aa3 for the Aa category; A1, A2, A3 for the A category
etc. Only the highest rating category (Aaa) and the two lowest (Ca, C) are not divided
into subcategories. Finally, an important distinction needs to be made between ratings
higher than Baa, which are labeled as investment grade, and those with a lower rating,
which are considered high yield or speculative grade (Hull, 2012).
2.2 Merton Model
One of the most popular approaches in the process of assessing credit risk involves the
implementation of the Merton Model. A structural framework, which exploits the Black
and Scholes (1973) option pricing formula, the method postulates that the firm can issue
two types of securities: equity and debt. The debt is assumed to have a zero-coupon
structure, implying that it pays no interest, with a maturity at a future time T . The
6
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firm enters default if the value of its assets is insufficient to repay its debt obligations at
T . The company’s equity is thus effectively a European call option on its assets, with a
maturity T and strike price, which is equal to the value of the debt. The model requires
several inputs for its implementation, namely the value of the company’s assets, their
volatility, the outstanding debt, and finally the equity value and volatility. Due to the
fact that the market’s estimation of the first two components cannot be observed, Jones
et. al (1984) theorized that can be inferred from the market value of the company’s
equity and the volatility of the equity (Hull, Nelken and White, 2004). It is important
to point out that in the context of this assumption the firm pays no dividends to its
equity investors.
An additional difficulty related to the practical application of the model is associ-
ated with the maturity structure of the firm’s debt obligations. As specified above, all
liabilities of the organization are required to have the same maturity T , which in practice
is not feasible. The work of Kealhofer (2003) and his KWM model, which has served as
a foundation for the Moody’s risk assessment methodology, presents a solution to this
issue. This specification states that the value of the firm’s debt can be calculated by
simply adding the company’s short-term liabilities and half of its long-term debt. Due
to its simplicity and practicality, this is an assumption that will also be employed in this
work (Kealhofer, 2003).
With the theoretical foundations behind the Merton Model in mind, the focus can
now be turned on the actual specifications of the methodology. As already stated, the
payment to shareholders in the context of the model is given by:
ET = max[AT −D, 0] (2.1)
where ET represents the value of the equity at time T , AT stands for the assets of
the firm when the debt matures, and D encapsulates its liabilities. In order to estimate
the PD, the model assumes that the assets follow a General Brownian Motion and are
normally distributed. These assumptions yield that:
dA = µAAdt+ σAAdW (2.2)
where µA is the expected continuously compounded return on the A; σA is the
volatility of A; and dW is a Wiener process. Both µA and σA are assumed to be
constant in the context of this classical specification. From (2.1) it is known that the
value of ET is a function of the company’s assets and debt at T . By applying the work
of Black and Scholes (1973) the current equity price can be determined in the following
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fashion:
Et = AtN(d1)−DerTN(d2) (2.3)
where At is the value of the assets at t = 0, and r represents the risk free interest
rate. N(·) is the cumulative standard normal distribution function and d1 and d2 are
calculated by (2.4) and (2.5) below,
d1 = ln
(
At
D
)
+
(
r +
σ2A
D
)
(T − t) (2.4)
d2 = d1 − σA
√
T − t (2.5)
From (2.3), (2.4) and (2.5) it can be concluded that:
Et = AtN
 ln(AtD )+
(
r +
σ2A
2
)
(T − t)
σA
√
(T − t)
−DerTN(d1 − σA√T − t) (2.6)
As already specified, there are two unobservable values in this equation, namely the
value of the company’s assets At and their volatility σA. Thus, in order for (2.6) to be
solved, one additional equation is required. When Ito’s lemma is applied to E[(At), t],
given that At follows a Geometric Brownian Motion with a drift µA and volatility σA.
σE =
At
Et
N(d1)σA (2.7)
where σE is the instantaneous volatility of the company’s equity at time zero. The
equation above allows the unobservable At and σA to be obtained from Et and σE . This
is done via the creation of an equation system, which includes Equations (2.6) and (2.7).
Matlab is then utilized, in order to solve the above specified equation system and to
obtain the unobservable values of At and σA.
The distance-to-default (DD) can then be obtained with the following formula:
DD =
ln
(
A
D
)
+ [µA + 0.5σA]T
σA
√
T
(2.8)
Here it needs to be clarified that since µA is not observable in this work the assump-
tion will be made that µA = r. Even though it is quite restrictive, and definitely not
universally applicable, it is commonly used in previous research, giving enough ground
for it to be applied here as well (see Nilsson, 2013; Kealhofer, 2003).
Finally, the risk neutral probability that the enterprise will default is effectively the
probability that the shareholders will not exercise the call option and buy the assets of
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the firm for D at maturity. This probability is given by PD=N(-DD).
2.3 Logistic Regression
Financial ratios have been widely exploited by academics in their strive to predict cor-
porate defaults. Beaver (1966) is among the first researchers to apply this methodology.
He chose 30 different financial ratios, in an attempt to find which of them have predic-
tive power when it comes to corporate failure, where “failure” is defined as the inability
of the organization to fulfill its contractual financial obligations at maturity. A highly
important finding related to this academic paper is the fact that Cash Flow to Total
Debt is the ratio, which has the largest degree of predictive power when it comes to
failure of firms (Beaver, 1966).
Arguably one of the most recognizable papers in the world of corporate finance,
when it comes to financial ratios, is the work of Altman (1968). It has served as the
foundation of a large number of academic papers, including but not being limited to
Deakin (1972), Edmister (1972), Taﬄer (1982), Goudie (1987), Grice and Ingram (2001)
and Agarwal and Taﬄer (2007). Known as the Z-score, the model is based on a linear
combination of five financial ratios, namely Working Capital to Total Assets (TA), Re-
tained Earnings to TA, Earnings Before Interest and Tax to TA, Market Value of Equity
to Total Liabilities, and Sales to TA, which are weighted by coefficient estimates based
on the sample of 66 defaulted and healthy firms. Originally, the model was applied only
on publically traded manufacturing companies, half of which had filed for bankruptcy.
The defaulted organizations were then matched with 33 business ventures, which main-
tained their solvency (Altman, 1968). Finally, it is worth mentioning that subsequently
the model has been developed in order to become applicable for both public and private
manufacturing and service companies.
Ohlson (1980) made another significant contribution to the empirical analysis deal-
ing with financial ratios via the employment of the logistic regression methodology. In
an attempt to overcome the limitations that previous researchers have faced, Ohlson
selected nine variables that he deemed helpful in the process of predicting corporate de-
fault, without providing theoretical justification in relation to his selection methodology.
The author then selected 2000 non-failed and 105 failed US, publically traded corpo-
rate entities and applied a logistic function in an attempt to predict their respective
failure probabilities. Since a Logit regression was applied, the author argued that he
has overcome a number of important restrictive features of previous models, including
the assumption of normal distribution and the arbitrary nature of the matching process
between healthy and defaulted firms (Ohlson, 1980).
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Building on Ohlson’s work, Lau (1987) extended the Logit model via the catego-
rization of organizations based on their financial health, ranging from financially stable
to fallen into bankruptcy and liquidation. It was then possible to calculate the proba-
bility of a firm moving from one category into another, further improving the predictive
capabilities of the framework. An additional development in this context was produced
by Ameur et. al (2008). The focus of the authors was to determine the variables with
the highest explanatory power for a bankruptcy event, and then use them to estimate
the default probability for a particular corporation. A large sample of defaulted US
companies in the period 1983 to 2002 was chosen. Mimicking the approach taken by
a number of other researchers, this study excludes financial service companies, because
of the difference they exhibit when compared to organizations from other industries in
terms of their structure and bankruptcy environment. All included entities were then
classified in relation to the sector in which they operate. The organizations’susceptibility
to a bankruptcy event was tested in relation to four standard ratio categories of explana-
tory variables, namely liquidity, activity, profitability and solidity. In total 34 financial
ratios were employed, in order to assess the ability of a firm to service its ongoing ex-
penditure, the efficiency of its asset usage, its short-term operating performance and its
long-term solvency. The authors conclude that there are a number of measures with a
high degree of relevance in the context of their model, with some of the most important
being Working Capital to Total Assets, Cost of Goods Sold to Sales and Net Income to
Total Assets (Ameur et. al, 2008).
Considering the fact that the aim of this paper is to calculate company specific
PD, the Logit regression methodology can be seen as a suitable alternative testing
method. Therefore, the results obtained from the application of this framework will
be used as supplementary to those estimated with the Merton model. In addition to
the abundant empirical work, which utilizes the logistic regression methodology, Burns
and Burns (2008) prove that this method entails fewer assumptions, while remaining
statistically robust. Furthermore, this approach exploits the most parsimonious model,
while maintaining the ability to identify the belonging of each firm to a specific group
(Burns and Burns, 2008). Since in this case the emphasis is placed on distinguishing
between healthy and defaulted firms, the Logit regression will be used in order to group
all the companies in those two categories.
With the rationale behind the selection of the logistic regression methodology in
mind, one can turn to the specifications governing the practical implication of the model.
The first step in the methodology is the creation of a dummy variable y, which takes the
value of 1 if a company defaults and 0 in case the organization maintains its solvency.
A Logit regression is then run, where the dummy variable is chosen as the dependent
and all financial ratios considered serve as the independent regressors. The coefficients
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for each regressor are then obtained and the random variable zi is created so that,
zi =
K∑
k=1
βkxk (2.9)
where x is the independent financial ratio, K represents the number of financial
ratios, and β is the respective coefficient on each individual ratio. Due to the fact that
this is a non-linear model, zi does not represent the actual PD for each company. PD
in this context is given by the (cumulative) logistic probability distribution function,
F (zi) =
1
1 + e−zi
(2.10)
where F (zi) depicts the probability that the firm will default and e represents the
exponential. An advantage of the above specified model is the fact that the obtained
default probability estimates can be neither negative nor larger than one, which is of
particular use in this context (Brooks, 2008).
The non-linearity of the model has an additional implication. All the β coefficients
estimated in (2.9) must be calculated via the usage of maximum likelihood (ML). This
is done in order to find the β coefficients that most accurately depict the relationship
expressed in the regression equation in relation to the data set being estimated (Frade,
2008). The likelihood function for each observation can then be expressed as:
Li =
(
1
1 + e−zi
)Yi
X
(
1
1 + ezi
)(1−Yi)
(2.11)
Since all observations are assumed to be independent, the joint likelihood function
will simply be the product of all N marginal likelihoods,
L(θ) =
N∏
i=1
(
1
1 + e−zi
)Yi
X
(
1
1 + ezi
)(1−Yi)
(2.12)
Due to the fact that it is easier to maximize an additive function, the natural
logarithm of the joint probability for all observations is then taken,
LLF = −
N∑
i=1
[
yi ln(1 + e
−zi) + (1− yi) ln(1 + ezi)
]
(2.13)
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2.4 Receiver-operating characteristic (ROC) curve
Considering the characteristics of the logistic regression and the Merton model, it needs
to be stated that both methodologies have certain limitations. The Merton model as-
sumes a constant risk-free rate and a uniform body of corporate debt. Furthermore, the
model is usually complex analytically and requires a lot of computations (Wang, 2009).
The Logit regression framework on the other hand suffers from the severe disadvantage
of being subject to accounting manipulations in the reporting methodology of organi-
zations (Ameur et. al, 2008). Considering these limitations, it is clear that on some
instances both frameworks can yield inaccurate conclusions regarding the creditworthi-
ness of some companies. There are two types of errors that can be encountered when
using these models:
I. Type I error implies a false prediction of non-default in a case when the firm has
actually defaulted, which is known as false non-default.
II. Type II error is related to a false prediction of default, in case the firm has
survived and is labeled as false default.
There is a natural trade-off between these two types of errors, depending on the chosen
default cutoff. Finally, it is of interest to point out that from the perspective of an in-
vestor in the debt obligations of any of the studied entities, Type II error is much more
damaging than a Type I.
Since both the Logistic regression and the Merton model are not flawless in their es-
timations, a technique capable of detecting the presence of Type I and Type II errors
in both credit risk assessment procedures must be employed. A perfect alternative can
be found in the receiver-operating characteristic (ROC) curve. Originally developed in
the 1950s, ROC curves were initially utilized by the field of medicine, where they were
used because of their propensity to successfully identify false positive and false negative
outcomes of a clinical trial. Since such a facet is applicable in the context of depicting
Type I and Type II errors in statistics, the formal statistical testing of the results of
the subsequently presented empirical study is made possible. Just like in medical trails,
an adequate default model should have the ability to effectively differentiate financially
healthy from unhealthy companies. Moody’s own quantitative credit risk group was
among the first to use this methodology. Baker Stein (2002) postulates that the power
of a default model lies in its capacity to account for true defaults and true survivals.
Briefly summarized, the ROC curve takes into account the existence of two populations,
default and healthy, both of which are plotted against the PD estimates for each indi-
vidual firm. In this way, the arbitrarily chosen default cutoff point becomes irrelevant,
since regardless of where it is actually set, what is important in the above described set-
ting is the fact that some healthy firms will be above it and some defaulted organization
will be below it, thus resulting in false defaults and false survivals. The null hypothesis
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is that if PD > x, where x is the randomly selected default threshold, the firm is antici-
pated to enter bankruptcy. It is therefore extremely straightforward to categorize Type
I and Type II errors. The most import output that streams from this methodology is
then associated with the specificity and sensitivity of the model, with the former being
related to its ability to recognize true defaults and the latter related to the correct doc-
umentation of true non-defaults. The ROC curve itself is a visualization of the above
depicted testing methodology. The shape of the curve is anticipated to be concave, with
a more concave curve characterizing a more powerful model, capable of better predict-
ing defaults. If the model being analyzed is completely unable to distinguish between
defaulted and healthy firms, it then produces PD that overlap the default and healthy
sample entirely. In such a case the ROC curve is a 45◦ line. A final alternative is for
the ROC curve to be convex, in which case the model predicts lower PD for defaulted
than for healthy firms, thus rendering the default risk assessment methodology all but
worthless. Finally, a key statistic related to the ROC curve is the area under the curve,
known as AUROC. Since the ROC curve is expected to be concave, a high AUROC is
associated with a more powerful model (Fabozzi, Chen, Hu, Pan 2010). Finally, using
the AUROC value, the Accuracy Ratio (AR) can be calculated in accordance with the
work of Engemann, Hayden and Tasche (2003). The authors postulate that,
AR = 2A− 1 (2.14)
where A is the AUROC. A model can be deemed as a good fit if AR is greater than
0.7.
Chapter 3
Data
The data set, which was selected in the context of both models presented above, consists
of 272 healthy companies, trading on the S&P 500 index during the entire course of the
sample period from 2006 to 2012. There were no specific criteria applied in the selection
process of these organizations, with the sole aim being the selection of solid corporate
entities, none of which has defaulted during the entire period of interest. Furthermore,
since the S&P 500 is the broadest US based compose, it is ensured that the firms chosen
for the study represent a variety of industries, thus arguably increasing the relevance of
the subsequently presented results.
The second part of the data set consists of a 56 defaulted US publically listed firms
during the period between 2006 and 2012. Information regarding corporate defaults
was obtained from reports published by Moody’s on annual basis. All the corporations
included have been declared bankrupt during the above specified period in accordance
with US legislation. There are two types of bankruptcy defined by US law, namely
Chapter 7, in which case the firm is liquidated and all of its assets are sold, and Chapter
11, which entails a reorganization of debt obligations and allows firms to proceed with
their existence. Thus, even though some of the firms that are listed as defaulted in this
study may currently be active, they have formally defaulted at a certain point in time
during the sample period.
3.1 Merton Model Data Specifications
In order to successfully implement the Merton model, yearly data regarding the long-
and short-term liabilities, along with the number of shares outstanding for all healthy
companies at year-end of 2011 were necessary. The same approach was also utilized in
the context of all defaulted firms, with the difference being that the data for them was
14
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collected one year prior to their default. Additionally, in order to calculate the equity
volatility of each organization, daily stock prices were taken and normalized. The value
of equity was calculate by multiplying the number of shares with the share price on the
last trading day of each year. Since the credit ratings provided by Moody’s are forward-
looking, implying that they offer guidance regarding the creditworthiness of corporations
for a timeframe of at least one year after the rating is issued, a similar approach will be
applied when the Merton model is calculated. Therefore, the yearly data on short-and
long-term liabilities, along with the value of equity at the end of 2011 will be taken as
inputs in the model. Via the usage of Matlab1, the value of the each company’s assets
and their volatility will be calculated. Finally, based on the specifications outlined in
Section 2.2 PD will be obtained for each organization. These default probabilities will
be used as guidelines for the likelihood of a company defaulting during the entire 2012,
implying that the PDs estimated will be used as a forward guidance regarding the
financial health of the organizations considered.
3.2 Logistic Regression Data Specifications
When the Logit regression was applied to the previously specified dataset, the methodol-
ogy that Ameur et. al (2007) used for their research was utilized. As detailed above, 34
financial ratios, grouped in four different categories, will be employed in order to assess
the creditworthiness of the companies being considered. The list of the financial ratios is
presented in Table A.2 in the Appendix and explores the influence of a large number of
accounting figures on the ability of organizations to service their debt obligations. Each
ratio is based on yearly accounting data, taken from the accounting statements of all
companies included in this empirical research. For each business entity being considered,
the ratios were tested for autocorrelation, and the once exhibiting high correlation to
a number of other ratios were excluded in an attempt to improve the model. Due to
the above described logic governing the credit ratings of Moody’s, all of the calculations
based on the Logit regression will have a one year predictive capability about the prob-
ability of default of a given company. Finally, when the value of the Logit regression
is equal to one, the firm in question is expected to experience default in the next 12
months, whereas if the value is equal to zero the firm should be able to maintain its
financial health.
1The script “Merton Structural Credit Model (Matrixwise Solver)” contributed by Mark Whirdy
at Mathworks was applied. Available at http://www.mathworks.se/matlabcentral/fileexchange/39717-
merton-structural-credit-model–matrixwise-solver-.
Chapter 4
Results
4.1 Merton Model Accuracy Test
The analysis of the results from the Merton model begins with the reaffirmation that it
does not suggest a specific cutoff default point. Therefore, a method capable of deter-
mining the presence of Type I and Type II errors is required. As previously specified,
a ROC curve provides a good basis for the analysis of the predictive capabilities of a
number of frameworks analyzing default risk. Figure 4.1 depicts the actual ROC curve,
with detailed information regarding the area under the curve presented in Table 4.1
below. As can be seen from the test results, the utilization of the Merton model can be
deemed as warranted in this context. At 0.834 the value of the area under the curve is
much higher than the null hypothesis of 0.5, implying that the model has the ability to
distinguish between defaulted and healthy firms in most of the instances being studied.
This is further proven by the AR value of the model, which in this setting is calculated to
be 0.668. The ROC curve, however has no informative properties regarding the nature
of the errors that have occurred during the calculation of the Merton model. In other
words, it is impossible to distinguish between Type I and Type II errors in this context.
Such classification is presented in Table 4.2 below. It is evident that the model struggles
with the identification of defaulted companies. Only 25% of the defaulted organizations
have been correctly identified, with the other 75% being classified as healthy even though
in reality they have defaulted within the next 12 months. This result comes as a clear
proof of the difficulty related to correctly assessing default risk, and more importantly in
accurately forecasting actual bankruptcies. This notion is further solidified by the fact
that 98.3% of the companies that did not default were successfully identified, leaving
the Type II errors at just 1.7% of the entire sample. Based on the above presented
results, it can be stipulated that in this context the Merton model performs much better
at identifying healthy companies, than at recognizing organizations that were about to
enter bankruptcy procedures. Even though the former is an integral part of credit risk
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analysis, as already postulated, investors are much more interested in the adequate pre-
diction of corporate defaults. Based on the results of this empirical study it can then be
argued, that while the model has a certain level of capacity to predict corporate defaults,
it certainly exhibits limitations when the correct identification of defaulted companies
is being considered.
Figure 4.1: Merton model ROC Curve
Table 4.1: Merton Model Area Under the Curve. Test Result Variables: PD
Asymptotic 95% Confidence Interval
Area Std. Errora Asymptotic Sigmab Lower Bound Upper Bound
0.834 0.029 0.000 0.777 0.891
a) Under the nonparametric assumption
b) Null hypothesis: true area = 0.5
Predicting Corporate Defaults: Evaluating Moody’s Credit Rating Institute 18
Table 4.2: Classification of the Merton model
Predictions
Dummy No. of non-defaults No. of defaults Overall percentage
0 = Not defaulted 285 5 98.3
1 = Defaulted 42 14 25.0
Total 86.4
The cut value is 0.5
As previously specified, the logistic regression approach was applied on the 56
defaulted companies and on the 272 healthy organizations used in this sample. An
approach taken by Ameur et. al (2007) was mimicked, with all of the 34 original
accounting ratios being utilized and listed in Table A.3 in the Appendix. Before
implementing the actual model it was necessary to check the correlation between the
individual ratios and determine which of them were highly correlated with the other
explanatory variables of interest. Additionally, the level of significance of each of the
variables was then considered, leading to a further exclusion those that had a lower
than 90% significance. Therefore, due to high level of correlation and lower than desired
level of significance for some financial ratios, the model was executed based on only
24 of the original 34 independent variables being considered. The list of the 24 ratios
utilized in this context can be found in Table A.1 in the Appendix.
Table 4.3: Classification of the Logistic Regression model
Predictions
Dummy No. of non-defaults No. of defaults Overall percentage
0 = Not defaulted 265 8 97.1
1 = Defaulted 15 41 73.2
Total 93.0
The cut value is 0.5
As can be seen from the results presented in Figure 4.2, the logistic regression model
exhibits high accuracy in detecting both defaulted and healthy organizations. As already
mentioned, the most import output that streams from this methodology is related to
the specificity and sensitivity of the model, with the former being related to its ability
to identify true defaults and the latter related to the correct assessment of true non-
defaults. In this case, 97.1% of all the healthy companies were correctly identified, and
additionally 73.2% of all defaulted firms were also accurately assessed. The fact that
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the logistic regression is characterized by relative low level of Type I and Type II errors,
is ascertained by the results of the ROC curve presented in Graph 2. It can then be
concluded that the logistic regression is able to quite accurately differentiate between
bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms.
Figure 4.2: Logistic Regression ROC Curve
4.2 Model Comparison
In this section the two credit risk assessment methodologies employed in this empirical
study will be evaluated in relation to the corresponding historic default rates presented
by Moody’s. The most accurate fashion, in which the evaluation process can be
implemented, comes in the form of an individual analysis of the credit risk assessments
for every company prepared by the rating agency. Since they are not publicly available,
firms will be grouped in relation to their credit rating and the average PD for each
rating class will be taken into consideration when the accuracy of each methodology
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is being determined. The analysis will be divided into two parts, related to the two
different methodologies employed in this paper. Therefore, a detailed evaluation of
the PD estimated obtained from the Merton model in the context of the historic
default rates presented by Moody’s will be offered. This will be done in order to
assess the quality of these default probabilities in relation to real world data. The
same procedure will then be utilized in relation to the results from the logistic regression.
Table 4.4: Merton model PD estimates for defaulted firms and historic default rates
for Moody’s rating classes.
Defaulted companies Rating PD Merton Avg PD Merton Avg PD Moody’s
Hovnanian Enterprises, Inc. B1 13.18%
10.44% 2.31%
American Airlines, Inc. B1 7.68%
Overseas Shipholding Group, Inc. B1 6.32%
Chemtura Corporation, Inc. B1 14.59%
Edison Mission Energy B2 11.01%
8.05% 4.73%
Penson Worldwide, Inc. B2 9.69%
U.S. Concrete, Inc. B2 3.40%
Tropicana Entertainment, LLC B2 8.09%
Midwest Generation, LLC B3 11.32%
10.25% 7.62%
Dex One Corporation B3 15.10%
Aventine Renewable Energy Holdings, Inc. B3 4.53%
HLI Operating Company , Inc. (OLD) B3 8.66%
Lyondell Chemical Company B3 11.62%
American Color Graphics Caa1 17.46%
11.59% 10.23%
InSight Health Services Corp. Caa1 4.53%
Movie Gallery, Inc. Caa1 5.41%
Remy International, Inc. Caa1 2.78%
Hawaiian Telcom Communications, Inc. Caa1 9.88%
Kimball Hill, Inc. Caa1 11.57%
Quebecor World, Inc. Caa1 10.17%
Vertis, Inc. Caa1 19.25%
Building Materials Holding Corporation Caa1 11.90%
Builders FirstSource, Inc. Caa1 12.75%
Local Insight Regatta Holdings, Inc. Caa1 12.08%
Horozin Lines, Inc. Caa1 4.14%
Nebraska Book Company, Inc. Caa1 34.12%
Aventine Renewable Energy Holdings , Inc. Caa1 7.62%
Broadview Networks Holdings , Inc. Caa1 12.22%
Global Aviation Holdings, Inc. Caa1 17.87%
Houghton Miﬄin Harcourt Publish, Inc. Caa1 13.90%
James River Coal Company Caa1 6.59%
Reddy Ice Holdings, Inc. Caa1 5.94%
North Atlantic Holding Company, Inc. Caa2 31.74%
19.59% 18.50%
Hines Nurseries Caa2 19.13%
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Leiner Health Products, Inc. Caa2 32.04%
19.59% 18.50%
Tousa, Inc. Caa2 17.60%
Wellman, Inc. Caa2 21.40%
BearingPoint, Inc. Caa2 16.93%
Milacron, Inc. Caa2 15.32%
Ahern Rentals, Inc. Caa2 12.47%
Sbarro, Inc. Caa2 30.01%
YRC Worldwide, Inc. Caa2 12.14%
ATP Oil & Gas Corporation Caa2 12.51%
Radio One, Inc. Caa2 8.74%
Securus Technologies, Inc. Caa2 6.22%
Eastman Kodak Company Caa2 38.69%
American Media Operations, Inc. Caa2 16.36%
LifeCare Holdings, Inc. Caa2 22.16%
Young Broadcasting, Inc. Caa3 13.82%
28 .33% 29.65%
Circus and Eldorado Joint Venture Caa3 60.75%
Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority Caa3 8.52%
Newark Group, Inc. Caa3 31.66%
Xerium Technologies, Inc. Caa3 7.92%
Ahern Rentals, Inc. Caa3 37.83%
Harry & David Holding, Inc. Caa3 30.82%
Dune Energy, Inc. Caa3 35.29%
Table 4.4 presents the results regarding the defaulted 56 companies, obtained
via the application of the Merton model. The final column in the table depicts the
historic default rates of the various ratings classes as stated in the annual credit
reports published by Moody’s. Since the rating agency does not offer specific PD
figures in its credit assessments, historic default rates can arguably be deemed as a
reasonable metric for bankruptcy risk. A good starting point would be to state that
on a number of instances the model presents default probabilities that are rather low,
especially considering that the companies in question are so close to default. There
are multiple firms with PD estimates lower than 10%, with US Concrete, Inc. and
Remy International, Inc. having PD values of 3.4% and 2.78% respectively. Such low
estimates certainly strengthen the conclusion drawn in Section 4.1 regarding the relative
inability of the Merton model to accurately identify true defaults. With that said,
the emphasis can now be shifted to the comparison of the historic default probability
associated with a specific rating class presented by Moody’s with the corresponding
average PD obtained via the Merton model. As can be seen from the table, the Merton
model performs much better when firms enjoying a higher credit rating are being
considered. When rating classes rated between B1 and B3 are being evaluated, it is
apparent that the Merton model is more conservative in its credit risk assessment. A
similar conclusion can be drawn when organizations rated Caa1 are examined. In this
context however, the difference between the two is much smaller. When it comes to
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businesses rated Caa2, the difference in PD is much lower, and for ventures with a
rating of Caa3 the PD estimates given by the Merton model are in fact lower than
the historic default rates observed by Moody’s. It can therefore be argued that due
to the size of the sample and the fact that all the companies being considered have
actually defaulted, the larger default probabilities calculated via the Merton model can
simply be a result of a selection bias. Since only defaulted companies are considered,
the Merton model is able to yield higher PD for higher rated companies due to their
lack of financial strength. One must then raise the question why was the credit rating
of these organizations so much higher than their default risk suggested by the rather
straightforward structural model utilized in this study. In can then be concluded that
in this context Moody’s was rather slow in adjusting its risk assessment firms that were
so close to defaulting.
With the analysis regarding the defaulted companies completed, the attention
can now be turned to Table 4.6, presenting the PD estimates of the Merton model
for the healthy companies in this sample. Based on the results listed in the table, it
can be claimed that for most ratings classes the Merton model overestimates default
probabilities. This observation is particularly apparent in the context of companies
with very high credit ratings. Organization rated Aaa, Aa1, Aa2 experience 0%
historic default rates, yet the model calculates their PD to be considerably higher. A
similar conclusion can be drawn regarding firms with credit ratings from A1 to Ba2.
However, when lower rated business entities are evaluated, the Merton model’s PD
computations are much more in line with historic default rates. On most of these
instances, excluding the case of the sole healthy company rated Caa1, the model is still
conservative when compared with historic default rates. With that said, this feature
is much less pronounced in this case and the discrepancy between the two metrics is
much smaller than for higher rated companies. However, when the results of the ROC
curve methodology and the PD estimates for defaulted firms are incorporated in this
context, it is impossible to unequivocally claim that the Merton model offers categorical
improvement on the methodology utilized by Moody’s.
With the analysis regarding the defaulted companies completed, the attention
can now be turned to Table 4.6, presenting the PD estimates of the Merton model
for the healthy companies in this sample. Based on the results listed in the table, it
can be claimed that for most ratings classes the Merton model overestimates default
probabilities. This observation is particularly apparent in the context of companies
with very high credit ratings. Organization rated Aaa, Aa1, Aa2 experience 0%
historic default rates, yet the model calculates their PD to be considerably higher. A
similar conclusion can be drawn regarding firms with credit ratings from A1 to Ba2.
However, when lower rated business entities are evaluated, the Merton model’s PD
computations are much more in line with historic default rates. On most of these
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instances, excluding the case of the sole healthy company rated Caa1, the model is still
conservative when compared with historic default rates. With that said, this feature
is much less pronounced in this case and the discrepancy between the two metrics is
much smaller than for higher rated companies. However, when the results of the ROC
curve methodology and the PD estimates for defaulted firms are incorporated in this
context, it is impossible to unequivocally claim that the Merton model offers categorical
improvement on the methodology utilized by Moody’s.
Table 4.6: Merton model PD estimates for healthy firms and historic default rates
for Moody’s rating classes
Healthy companies
Credit rating Number of companies Average PD Merton Average PD Moody’s
Aaa 2 3.09% 0.00%
Aa1 1 5.38% 0.00%
Aa2 2 2.11% 0.00%
Aa3 5 3.86% 0.11%
A1 8 4.24% 0.06%
A2 29 4.20% 0.03%
A3 24 3.80% 0.04%
Baa1 40 4.47% 0.13%
Baa2 49 4.25% 0.14%
Baa3 52 4.50% 0.35%
Ba1 18 4.86% 0.67%
Ba2 7 2.90% 0.59%
Ba3 14 4.62% 1.95%
B1 9 4.54% 2.31%
B2 6 5.99% 4.73%
B3 5 7.60% 7.62%
Caa1 1 7.94% 10.23%
With the results regarding the Merton model in mind, the analysis can now be focused
to the Logit regression PD estimates. The resulting PD estimates for the defaulted
companies are presented in Table 4.7. The PD calculated with the logistic regression
will again be compared with the actual historic default rates for the corresponding rat-
ing class. Unlike the Merton model, the logistic regression yields extremely high default
probabilities for all firms being considered. In this setting however, this is arguably
desirable. Since the aim is to minimize the existence of Type I errors, it is quite advan-
tageous that the model predicts such high possibility of bankruptcy for all the defaulted
organizations. On the other hand, the model’s computations are much higher than the
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historic default rates for the different ratings classes. As previously stated however,
Moody’s was unable to adjust its credit ratings with the necessary urgency in this par-
ticular context. This can then lead to the conclusion that the relative conservativeness
of the Logit regression approach is warranted.
Table 4.7: Logistic Regression PD estimates for defaulted firms and historic default
rates for Moody’s rating classes
Defaulted companies
Credit rating Number of companies Average PD Logistic Average PD Moody’s
B1 4 91.95% 2.31%
B2 4 76.70% 4.73%
B3 5 84.65% 7.62%
Caa1 19 92.78% 10.23%
Caa2 16 89.53% 18.50%
Caa3 8 90.01% 29.65%
Table 4.8: Logistic Regression PD estimates for healthy firms and historic default
rates for Moody’s rating classes
Defaulted companies
Credit rating Number of companies Average PD Logistic Average PD Moody’s
Aaa 2 27.90% 0.00%
Aa1 1 59.95% 0.00%
Aa2 2 15.38% 0.00%
Aa3 5 36.51% 0.11%
A1 8 38.67% 0.06%
A2 29 25.35% 0.03%
A3 24 26.26% 0.04%
Baa1 40 36.25% 0.13%
Baa2 49 35.15% 0.14%
Baa3 52 30.20% 0.35%
Ba1 18 29.12% 0.67%
Ba2 7 29.53% 0.59%
Ba3 14 36.43% 1.95%
B1 9 46.40% 2.31%
B2 6 18.88% 4.73%
B3 5 31.73% 7.62%
Caa1 1 57.02% 10.23%
When the attention is turned to Table 4.8, presenting the PD estimates from the lo-
gistic regression for the healthy companies, there are a number of issues that require
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consideration. First and foremost, it needs to be underscored that the average de-
fault probabilities obtained from the logistic regression are much higher across all rating
classes, when compared with the historic default rates presented by Moody’s. Even
though there are only two companies having the highest Aaa rating in this study, it is
quit shocking to see that their average PD can be as high as 27.9%. Such companies are
expected to have extremely low default risk and the default probabilities obtained from
the Logit regression can arguably be deemed as unreasonably high. A similar conclu-
sion can be reached when it comes to organizations rated Aa1, Aa2, Aa3. The picture
does not change for organizations with lower ratings either, with the logistic regression
grossly overestimating their PD in comparison to actual observed historic default rates.
It can therefore be concluded that the Logit regression is performing quite poorly, when
it comes to the healthy companies in the context of this particular data set. With that
in mind, it is vital to reiterate that the methodology was concluded to be able to ac-
curately identify healthy businesses 97.1% of the time. A limitation in the ROC curve
methodology can then be pointed. Since, as already shown, the logistic regression is very
conservative in its PD estimates for defaulted companies, it is possible that the cutoff
default point is selected so high, that organizations with PD of 30% or even higher can
be identified as healthy. When being mindful of the fact that only companies with the
lowest possible credit rating exhibit historic default rates with such frequency, it then
becomes apparent that the PD computations obtained from the logistic regression are
arguably unrealistic. Even though the model theoretically works and fulfils the ROC
curve test, the resulting PD estimates for the healthy companies lead to the conclusion
that with this particular data set, the Logit regression is overly conservative and enjoys
little real world implications.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
This paper utilized a sample of 272 healthy companies and 56 defaulted organization
in an attempt to evaluate the ability of the Logit regression framework and the Merton
model to correctly predict corporate defaults. Additionally, the default probabilities
obtained from the aforementioned methodologies were compared to the corresponding
rating class historic default rates presented by Moody’s.
The Merton model was able to successfully classify only 25% of the defaulted com-
panies and 98.3% of the healthy organizations. As far as bankrupt business entities
are concerned, the model significantly underperformed the Logistic regression, which
correctly identified 73.2% of the defaulted firms. Furthermore, the logistic regression
accurately recognized 97.1% of the healthy companies, thus clearly offering superior
performance in relation to its ability to distinguish between defaulted and healthy orga-
nizations.
With that said, the Logistic regression yielded very conservative PD estimates for
both healthy and defaulted organizations. In the context of the latter this can be deemed
advantageous, since all of the organization included in this group defaulted within the
next 12 months. The default probabilities for the healthy firms were however overly
cautious, especially when compared to the corresponding rating class historic default
rates presented by Moody’s. It can therefore be concluded that even though the Logis-
tic regression was more successful at recognizing defaulted companies, the PD estimates
offered by this methodology were overly conservative and thus have little real world
implications.
The Merton model offered PD estimates that were much more in line with historic
default rates. The framework was more conservative only in relation to higher ratings
classes, and even in this context was much closer to actual observed default rates than
the Logistic regression. The model however offered lackluster performance when the ac-
tual identification of defaulted corporations is concerned, making it impossible to claim
that it yielded superior results than the logistic regression. With one model being overly
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conservative and the other not conservative enough, it can only be concluded that the
point of default it extremely difficult to pinpoint, thus leaving an appealing opportunity
for future research, in the continuous strive to improve the accuracy of the existing credit
risk assessment methods.
Appendix A
Appendix
A.1 Tables
Table A.1: SPSS Output for Logistic Regression
Ratio Coefficient
Current Assets/Current Liabilities 4.862
Cash/Current Liabilities 17.290
Cash/Total Assets -24.523
Cash Flow/Current Liabilities -79.937
Cash Flow/Total Debt 392.707
Current Liabilities/Equity -2.559
Current Assets/Total Debt -36.398
Quick Assets/Current Liabilities -6.351
Quick Assets/Inventories -1.302
Working Capital/Total Assets -7.930
Working Capital/Sales 2.904
Inventories/Sales -29.484
Accounts Receivable/Sales -15.808
AR/Inventories -0.120
COGs/Inventories 0.999
COGs/Sales -27.333
NI/Total Assets -184.095
NI/Equity -1.842
NI/Sales 12.781
Retained Earnings/Total Assets 2.934
EBIT/Invested Capital -.080
EBIT/Total Assets 6.102
EBIT/Sales -58.357
Sales/Total Assets 68.651
28
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Table A.2: Moody ’s Global Corporate Average Cumulative Default Rates (%, 1981–
2013)
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Table A.3: Classification of Financial Ratios by Ameur et. al (2007)
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